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PROPORTIONALITY AND PUNISHMENT:
DOUBLE COUNTING UNDER THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Gary Swearingen
Abstract: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines enhance sentences when the commission
of a crime includes certain kinds of egregious conduct. The guidelines define such egre-
gious conduct in a way that allows the sentencing judge to enhance the defendant's sen-
tence twice for the same conduct-once as a "characteristic" of the specific offense for
which the defendant is convicted and again under a general "adjustments" section. The
federal circuit courts are divided concerning whether the guidelines permit double count-
ing. This Comment examines the courts' differing interpretations of the governing statutes
and concludes that the guidelines do not permit double counting unless explicitly stated in
the sentencing guidelines.
That the punishment should fit the crime is a recurring theme in the
American justice system. It was one of the foundation themes of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 19841 which authorized the United States
Sentencing Guidelines.2 Contrary to this theme, some courts have
interpreted the guidelines to require convicted criminal offenders to
receive duplicative sentence "enhancements" for the same criminal
conduct, thus imposing more punishment than the crime deserves.
This Comment examines the problem of double counting criminal
conduct under the guidelines. It begins with a discussion of the pur-
poses of the sentencing guidelines and the use of enhancements under
the guidelines. The Comment then describes double counting and the
split in the federal circuit courts as to whether the guidelines permit
double counting. Finally, the Comment examines the findings of the
circuit courts and concludes that double counting should not occur
under the guidelines except in the rare instances where the guidelines
explicitly call for it.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3625 and 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991-998 (1988)).
2. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL 2 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. All references are to the 1993 guidelines unless
otherwise noted.
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I. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND
DOUBLE COUNTING
The Sentencing Reform Act was the first comprehensive sentencing
law for the federal system. It culminated more than a decade of
efforts by reformers aiming to curb broad discretion of federal judges
and the corresponding disparity in sentences.4 The support for sen-
tencing reform came from a diverse group including conservatives, lib-
erals, judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys.5 In the Act,
Congress laid the foundation for sentencing reform. It stated the pur-
poses for sentencing6 and for sentencing reform7 and left the details of
the new sentencing system to the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion which ultimately promulgated the guidelines.' To understand the
problem of double counting it is necessary to focus on the purpose of
the Sentencing Reform Act and examine the guidelines' enhancement
mechanisms.
A. The Purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act
Congress created the Sentencing Commission and gave it broad dis-
cretion to develop a sentencing system that would make sentences
more fair for offenders and society.9 Congress wanted a new sentenc-
ing system to promote honesty,10 proportionality, and of primary
importance, uniformity in sentencing." Preguidelines sentencing
practice resulted in wide disparity in sentences. 2 Each federal judge
3. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3220.
4. Id. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
(1973).
5. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 37, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3220. Congress
intended that this diversity extend to the Sentencing Commission. Id. at. 63, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3246. Note, however, that the President did not appoint a defense attorney to the
Commission. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines 101 HARV. L. Ray. 1938, 1948 (1988).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (1988).
8. Id. § 991(a). The Commission must submit the guidelines to Congress, but Congressional
inaction is deemed approval. Id § 994(p).
9. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 39, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222.
10. The goal of honesty is to be achieved by abolishing the parole system. U.S.S.G., supra
note 2, at 2. It has no impact on the following double counting analysis and is therefore not
further discussed.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988); U.S.S.G., supra note 2, at 2. For an analysis of whether
these goals are being met, see Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMoRY L.J.
393 (1991).
12. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 38, 41-48, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221,
3224-31 (showing empirically the wide disparity in sentences).
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had his or her own sentencing rationale and handed out sentences con-
strained only by broad statutory maximum, and sometimes minimum,
sentences. 13 The guidelines set narrow sentence ranges for criminal
offenses to constrain judges in sentencing.14 By setting a narrow range
for each offense, Congress intended that sentences across the nation
become more uniform.15
Congress' second goal was proportionality in sentencing. Congress
recognized that uniformity by itself is unworkable and unfair. 6 With
strict uniformity, offenders committing similar crimes would receive
the same sentence even if one committed the crime in a less egregious
fashion than the other.17 An armed robber, for example, would
receive the same sentence as an unarmed robber. The sentence for one
of these robbers would be unfair--either the armed robber receives too
lenient a sentence or the unarmed robber receives too severe a sen-
tence.1 8 Congress postulated that this disparity would result in unfair-
ness to offenders when they are punished too severely and unfairness
to society when offenders are punished too leniently. 9 Congress thus
expected that the Commission would provide a method that would
vary sentences based on aggravating and mitigating factors.20
B. Enhancements Under the Sentencing Guidelines
The guidelines set forth narrow sentencing ranges for specific cate-
gories of offenses.21 Two factors determine the sentencing range: the
severity level of the offense, and the offender's criminal record.22 The
guidelines use a grid with the offender's criminal history score on the
horizontal axis and a measure of the offense's severity on the vertical
13. Id. at 39, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222.
14. See infra notes 21-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of how judges determine
sentence ranges.
15. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3235. But see
Gerald W. Heaney, Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
161, 189, 202 (1991) (arguing that there has been no reduction in sentence disparity).
16. See U.S.S.G., supra note 2, at 2.
17. Id.
18. A third, and more likely scenario, is that the Commission would split the difference with
neither robber getting the punishment he or she deserves.
19. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 45-46, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3228-29.
Congress also thought that disproportional sentences would create tension among inmates angry
about their relative sentences. Id. Too severe sentences also increase prison overcrowding,
which Congress sought to avoid. Id. at 61, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3244.
20. Id. at 52, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3235.
21. The sentencing range cannot exceed 25 percent of the minimum sentence or six months,
whichever is greater. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1988).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (1988); U.S.S.G., supra note 2, at 1.
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axis.23 At the intersection of the axes is a range of months for which a
judge may sentence a defendant.
The sentencing judge determines the severity of the offense through
several factors.24 The statutory violation of which the defendant was
convicted provides the base offense level.25 The guidelines increase the
offense level in two ways. First, judges must increase the offense level
if the defendant's crime included "specific offense characteristics, '26
such as using a weapon in a robbery27 or engaging in more than mini-
mal planning of a fraud crime.28 Second, judges also must apply
"adjustments" to the offense level.29 Unlike specific offense character-
istics, adjustments apply to any crime.3 Judges will enhance a
defendant's offense level whenever, for example, the defendant is an
organizer or leader of a crime.31 Although the sentencing judge may
depart up or down from the guidelines range in special circum-
stances, 32 because the Commission designed departures to be the
exception,33 the guidelines achieve their goal of proportionality pri-
marily through the two types of modification.
C. Double Counting
Double counting occurs when the judge applies an enhancement in
the adjustments section of the guidelines for conduct already
23. There are 6 criminal history categories and 43 offense level categories, amounting to 258
cells in the sentencing grid.
24. The steps outlined below are those taken for one count of conviction. An additional step
is necessary to group multiple counts to avoid unjust multiple punishment. See U.S.S.G., supra
note 2, § 3D1.l.
25. Id. § 1Bl.l(a). The guidelines manual lists the guidelines section that applies to each
federal criminal statute. Id. App. A.
26. Id. § IBL.I(b). These characteristics apply only to particular offenses and are listed under
those offenses.
27. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2) (five-level enhancement if the gun was fired, four if "otherwise used,"
and three if just possessed).
28. Id' § 2F1.l(b)(2) (two-level enhancement).
29. Id § IBL.1(c). Adjustments can increase or decrease a sentence. There are, however, a
disproportionate number of increasing adjustments compared to reductions. See Ogletree, supra
note 5, at 1951-54.
30. See U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § IBl.1.
31. Id. § 3B1.l(c).
32. See, eg., United States v. Maier, 975 F.2d 944, 945 (2d Cir. 1992) (downward departure
for defendant's drug addiction); United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 253 (6th Cir. 1991)
(upward departure for extremely brutal child abuse), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1994 (1992). See
generally Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of the Emerging Departure
Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1991)
(describing the use of departures by the federal courts).
33. Judges may depart from the guidelines only when there are aggravating or mitigating
circumstances that the Commission has not adequately considered in the guidelines. U.S.S.G.,
supra note 2, § 5K2.0.
Sentencing Guidelines
accounted for either in the definition of the offense,34 in a specific
offense characteristic enhancement,35 or in the defendant's criminal
history.36 If, for example, a bank examiner who accepted a bribe
receives an increased sentence for abuse of a position of trust37 the
court has double counted the examiner's behavior because the exam-
iner's crime already assumes such an abuse.3" Double counting also
occurs when the judge departs from the guidelines based on conduct
already considered in the guideline mechanisms. 39 For example, if a
judge departs upward from the guidelines because a defendant com-
mitted multiple robberies, this results in double counting because the
guidelines already account for multi-count convictions.'
The guidelines have explicitly prohibited double counting in certain
situations. They do not permit judges to apply the adjustment
enhancement for a vulnerable victim41 to increase sentences, for exam-
ple, when the definition of the offense or of a specific offense character-
istic includes that vulnerability. 42 The enhancements for an official
34. See, eg., Erich D. Andersen, Enhancement for "Abuse of a Position of Trust" Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 70 OR. L. REv. 181, 198-203 (1991).
35. See United States v. Romano, 970 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1992).
36. See United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159 (1lth Cir. 1992) (permitting a past crime to
serve as the basis for an enhancement for being previously deported after conviction of a felony
and to count in the defendant's criminal history); see also infra notes 47-51 and accompanying
text.
37. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 3BI.3.
38. See id § 2C1.6 cmt. 1; see also Andersen, supra note 34, at 198-203.
39. See United States v. Eagan, 965 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Phillip, 948
F.2d 241, 257 (6th Cir. 1991) (Merritt, J., dissenting), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1994 (1992).
40. See United States v. Coe, 891 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1989). The concept of double
counting is similar to violations of the double jeopardy clause when, for example, a defendant
who takes a car is charged both with joyriding and with auto theft. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.
161, 163 (1977). Although the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution protects defendants
against multiple convictions for the same offense, it does little to protect defendants from
cumulative punishment for the same offense. Legislatures are "free to prescribe two different
punishments.., for a single offense." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 370 (1983) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
41. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 3AI.1. A vulnerable victim is one whose age, physical or mental
condition, or other factor makes the victim particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct. Id.
42. Id. § 3Al.I cmt. 2. Double counting would occur where, for example, the victim in a
criminal sexual abuse case was under 12 years old and the judge enhanced the sentence under the
vulnerable victim adjustment. The specific offense characteristics for criminal sexual abuse
already contain an enhancement for children under 12. Id. § 2A3.1(b)(2). But, if age was not
the only vulnerable characteristic of the victim, the guidelines would permit multiple
enhancements. For example, if the victim was both young and disabled and the disabling factor
made the victim particularly susceptible to the crime, then the guidelines would permit a judge to
apply the enhancement.
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victim4 3 and for restraint of a victim44 also include an explicit double
counting limitation.
The guidelines also prohibit double counting when judges depart
from the guidelines. The guidelines permit departures from the guide-
line range only when the court finds aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances not adequately taken into consideration by the Commission./
Thus, any explicit enhancement in the guidelines forecloses the possi-
bility of a sentencing judge using that conduct as a basis for increasing
a sentence through the departure mechanism.'
The guidelines explicitly permit double counting in one situation.47
The crime of illegally reentering the United States after being
deported48 carries with it a specific offense characteristic enhancement
if the defendant was previously deported after a felony conviction.49
The guidelines specifically state that this enhancement is in addition to
any criminal history points added for the felony conviction in the
criminal history score, even though the enhancement and the crime
involve the same conduct 5 Courts applying the enhancement note,
however, that this double counting is unique because it advances two
distinct policies-punishing recidivists through the criminal history
score, and punishing the wrongfulness of the act through the
enhancement. 51
D. The Method for Analyzing the Sentencing Guidelines
Courts interpreting the sentencing guidelines follow the same rules
of statutory construction that they use to interpret criminal statutes.52
The Supreme Court has established three areas to examine when ana-
43. Id. § 3A1.2 cmt. 3. Law enforcement and corrections officers, as well as their immediate
family members are examples of official victims. Id. § 3A1.2.
44. Id. § 3A1.3 cmt. 2. Restraint of victim occurs when the victim is physically restrained,
such as tied up during a robbery. Id. § 3A1.3
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.0.
46. Of course, if the sentencing judge did not apply the enhancemert and just departed from
the guidelines, no double counting would occur. This would be an improper basis for departure,
however.
47. A second potential area of permitted double counting arises when applying multiple
specific offense characteristics for an offense. Guidelines commentary requires judges to apply
these enhancements cumulatively, but the Commission defines these enhancements so that there
can be no overlap of conduct. See U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § IB1.I cmt. 4.
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988).
49. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 2L1.2(b)(1).
50. Id. § 2L1.2 cmt. 5; see United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159 (1lth Cir. 1992).
51. Adeleke, 968 F.2d at 1161; United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1992).
52. United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 243 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2057
(1991); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 391 (1989) (likening the guidelines to
court rules).
720
Vol. 68:715, 1993
Sentencing Guidelines
lyzing criminal statutes: the language and structure of the statute; if
the text is ambiguous, Congressional intent behind the specific statu-
tory language the court is addressing; and, if uncertainty persists, the
motivating policies behind the entire statute.53 If ambiguity still exists
after this analysis, a court must interpret the statute in favor of lenity
to the defendant. 4
In the first step of analyzing statutory construction, the court looks
to the statute's language, giving words their plain or ordinary mean-
ing. 5 If the plain meaning of statutory language appears to settle the
issue, and no clear legislative intent exists to the contrary, the court
ends its analysis.5 6 If the plain language inquiry does not resolve the
issue, the court proceeds to the second step and seeks to glean the
meaning of a particular section by referring to the structure of the
entire statute. Provisions and language included or excluded in other
portions of the statute can shed light on the meaning of a separate
section of the statute.57
If the issue is not resolved after examining the structure of the
guidelines, the court turns to the legislative history of the statute to
determine legislative intent as to the specific statutory language in
question." Another area in which a court can glean the meaning of
statutory language is the motivating policies behind the statute.
59 If
the meaning of the statutory language is still ambiguous at the end of
this analysis, the court must apply the rule of lenity and decide the
53. United States v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. 1329, 1338 (1992) (applying these criteria to a case
involving the guidelines); Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 461, 465 (1990); Bifulco v. United
States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980).
54. R.L.C, 112 S. Ct. at 1338; Moskal, 111 S. Ct. at 465.
55. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. at 1334 (looking first to the "plain meaning" of the statute); Moskal,
111 S. Ct. at 465 ("In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language ... giving
the 'words used' their 'ordinary meaning.' ") (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9
(1962)).
56. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 n.3 (1981) (per curiam); United
States v. Neal, 976 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1992) (sentencing guidelines case). But see R.L C, 112 S.
Ct. at 1339-41 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that legislative history should never be used to
construe an otherwise ambiguous criminal statute against a defendant).
57. See, eg., Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) (holding that
courts should interpret statutory language to give effect to all parts of the statute, leaving no
wholly superfluous language).
58. A court can determine the legislative intent of the guidelines from looking at the history
of Congress' enabling legislation, the Sentencing Reform Act, and the Sentencing Commission's
policy statements.
59. Legislative intent, for purposes of this Comment, refers to the intent of Congress and the
Commission to permit or prohibit double counting. The motivating policies, on the other hand,
are the general purposes behind sentencing reform, such as uniformity and proportionality in
sentencing.
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issue in the defendant's favor.' The rule of lenity prohibits courts
from interpreting criminal statutes to increase a defendant's penalties
if the court bases such an interpretation on nothing more than conjec-
ture of congressional intent.6 1 The rule embodies two policies: provid-
ing fair warning to the world of what will happen if people perform
certain conduct, and ensuring that legislatures, and not courts, define
criminal conduct and criminal punishment.62  The rule applies not
only to the interpretations of the substantive criminal statutes, but also
to the penalties they impose, 63 and applies equally to the sentencing
guidelines.'
E. The Split Among the Federal Circuit Courts on When Double
Counting is Permissible
Federal circuit courts disagree as to what constitutes impermissible
double counting. Two cases, United States v. Curtis61 and United
States v. Romano,6 6 exemplify this controversy. Both cases involved
separate specific offense character enhancements for "more than mini-
mal planning" of a crime' and adjustment enhancements for
"organizing or managing" a crime.68  The Curtis court held that
double counting is permitted except when the guidelines explicitly pro-
hibit it.69 The Romano court, on the other hand, held that when the
guidelines are ambiguous about double counting, the courts should
resolve this ambiguity in favor of lenity and not allow double
counting.7 °
60. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. at 1338; Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 400 (1980).
61. Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387.
62. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
63. Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387.
64. R.L.C, 112 S. Ct. at 1338.
65. 934 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1991).
66. 970 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1992).
67. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, §§ 2B1.1(b)(5), 2F1.1(b)(2)(A). Both enhancement sections
provide for a two-level enhancement when the "offense involved more than minimal planning."
More than minimal planning means "more planning than is typical for commission of the offense
in a simple form." Id. § lB 1.1 cmt. I(f). It includes, for example, crimes involving repeated acts
over a period of time, luring the victim to the crime location, or preparing false invoices to cover
an embezzlement. Id.
68. Id. § 3B1.1. The guidelines applicable in Curtis stated: "If the defendant was an
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity... ir crease by 2 levels." Id.
§ 3B1. 1(c). The provision in Romano stated: "If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a
criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4
levels." Id. § 3Bl.l(a).
69. Curtis, 934 F.2d at 556.
70. Romano, 970 F.2d at 167.
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L The Fourth Circuit View
In United States v. Curtis, a jury convicted the defendant of falsely
impersonating an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice ("INS"). 71 Curtis presented false identification to furniture store
employees and led them to believe that the government would pay for
the furniture that was actually for his home. 72 As part of this scheme,
Curtis asked two others to call the store and support his story that he
was an INS special agent and that the government would pay for the
furniture.73 His ploy finally worked and the store delivered $3,000 in
furniture to Curtis's home.74 When the store did not receive payment,
store officials called the authorities who arrested Curtis for imperson-
ating an INS agent.75
After Curtis's conviction, the district court judge sentenced him
under the guidelines for impersonation and theft.76 The judge then
enhanced Curtis's sentence under the specific offense characteristics
because his crime involved more than minimal planning. 77 The judge
further enhanced Curtis's sentence under the adjustments section for
being an organizer of a crime involving other people.78 On appeal,
Curtis argued that the district court judge erred by applying two sepa-
rate enhancements based on the same conduct. This, he claimed,
amounted to impermissible double counting.79
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Curtis's double
counting argument. The court based its rejection on two sections of
the commentary to the guidelines. The court first noted that the
"Application Notes" commentary to several other guidelines sections
does not permit an offense level increase based on conduct already
accounted for in the definition of the offense.8" Applying the canon of
statutory construction expressio unis est exclusio alterius (expressio
unis),8 1 the court determined that the absence of commentary prohib-
71. Curtis, 934 F.2d at 554.
72. Id. at 555.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see supra note 67 (quoting the guideline section). The section under which Curtis was
convicted was formerly designated § 2B1.1(b)(4).
78. Curtis, 934 F.2d at 555; see supra note 68 (quoting the guideline section).
79. Curtis, 934 F.2d at 556.
80. Id.
81. In English, the enumeration of specific exclusions to a statute indicates that the statute
applies to all cases not specifically excluded.
Washington Law Review
iting multiple enhancements suggested that both enhancements could
apply to the same offense.82
The court also placed great weight on the commentary to the "Gen-
eral Application Principles" section of the guidelines. This commen-
tary directed the courts to cumulatively apply enhancements for
several specific offense characteristics within a guideline unless the
guidelines state otherwise.13 Consequently, the court held that if con-
duct falls within the guidelines' definition, courts should increase the
offense level for each enhancement unless the guidelines explicitly for-
bid double counting."4
2. The Sixth Circuit View
The Sixth Circuit's analysis of the guidelines in United States v.
Romano 5 differed from the Fourth Circuit's apiproach. Romano
involved a medical clinic owner convicted of several crimes growing
out of a complex scheme to defraud Medicaid. 6 The defendant
Romano owned three medical clinics in Detroit. 7 He hired doctors
for the use of their names on prescriptions and use of their provider
numbers to bill the Michigan Medicaid program for medical tests
although these doctors rarely, if ever, saw patients."
A jury convicted the defendant on twelve counts including conspir-
acy, Medicaid fraud, and unlawful distribution of controlled sub-
stances.8 9 After determining the sentencing guidelines criteria for
these offenses, the district court judge applied the relevant specific
offense characteristic enhancements, including an enhancement for
engaging in more than minimal planning of the crime.' The court
then enhanced the defendant's sentence under the adjustments section
for being an organizer or leader of five or more persons. 91 Romano
appealed.
82. Curtis, 934 F.2d at 556.
83. Id. The commentary states: "The offense level adjustments from more than one specific
offense characteristic within an offense guideline are cumulative (added together) unless the
guideline specifies that only the greater (or greatest) is to be used." U.S.S.G., supra note 2,
§ 1B1.1 cmt. 4.
84. Curtis, 934 F.2d at 556.
85. 970 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1992).
86. Id. at 165.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see supra note 67 (quoting the guidelines section).
91. Romano, 970 F.2d at 166; see supra note 68 (quoting the guidelines section).
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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Fourth Circuit's
"narrow" view of double counting.92 The court instead followed a line
of Supreme Court decisions that require clear legislative intent before
courts apply sentence enhancement provisions cumulatively. 93 The
court noted that this line of cases followed the rule of lenity in crimi-
nal cases.94
The Romano court adopted the view previously articulated by the
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Werlinger,95 that the Commission
did not intend to punish defendants twice for the same conduct,96 and
held that it was bound by the rule of lenity to conclude that the guide-
lines prohibited double counting.9 7 Applying this rule to the facts of
Romano, the court concluded that because being an organizer or
leader of a crime necessarily entails more than minimal planning, the
district court erred by double counting this conduct in sentencing
Romano. 98
II. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES DO NOT
PERMIT DOUBLE COUNTING
An enhancement under either the specific offense characteristic sec-
tions or the adjustment section cannot be based on conduct necessarily
accounted for in the other section.99 The Sixth Circuit came to this
conclusion while the Fourth Circuit did not. The following analysis
examines the Sixth and Fourth Circuit decisions in light of the ana-
lytic framework for statutory construction laid down by the Supreme
92. Romano, 970 F.2d at 166.
93. Id. at 167 (citing Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1980); Simpson v. United
States, 435 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1978)).
94. Romano, 970 F.2d at 167; see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
95. 894 F.2d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1990).
96. Romano, 970 F.2d at 167. The Curtis court, however, distinguished Werlinger. It
characterized Werlinger as holding that the defendant's conduct did not meet the enhancement
definition, not that applying the enhancement would be impermissible double counting. Curtis v.
United States, 934 F.2d 553, 556 n.2 (4th Cir. 1991).
97. Romano, 970 F.2d at 167 ("[I]f certain conduct is used to enhance a defendant's sentence
under one enhancement provision, the defendant should not be penalized for that same conduct
again under a separate provision.").
98. Id. The court found support for this statement in the Application Notes which state that
in applying the organizing role provision "the court should consider . . . the degree of
participation in planning or organizing the offense." U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 3B1.1 cmt 3. The
guidelines thus include planning the crime in the organizing enhancement.
99. While the guidelines call for imposition of specific offense characteristic enhancements
first, U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 1B1.1(b), justice calls for judges to impose the enhancement that
carries the greater penalty (presumably for the most egregious conduct).
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Court."°° It concludes that the Sixth Circuit came to the correct
conclusion.
A. The Sixth Circuit Used the Correct Approach
The Sixth Circuit's conclusion that double counting is not permitted
under the guidelines is correct for several reasons. First, the language
and structure of the guidelines do not support double counting. Sec-
ond, the legislative history does not support double counting. Third,
double counting is inconsistent with the motivating policies of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act. Fourth, the guidelines are at best ambiguous as
to whether they permit double counting; thus, the rule of lenity applies
to prohibit the practice. Finally, state courts support a rule against
double counting. The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, applied a
flawed approach to statutory construction and arrived at the incorrect
conclusion that the guidelines permit double counting.
1. Language and Structure of the Guidelines Do Not Support
Double Counting
The plain language of the guidelines does not support double count-
ing enhancements. The guidelines sections that define offense levels 01
and that adjust offense levels 02 merely delineate conduct that requires
imposition of enhancements. They do not discuss interplay between
these mechanisms. Likewise the application instructions10 3 lay out the
steps to follow in determining a sentence range, but do not provide a
guide to resolving conflicts among the steps. There is no language in
the guidelines to support the cumulative application of enhance-
ments. 104
As with the plain-language inquiry, the structure of the sentencing
guidelines does not support double counting. The guidelines' language
does not present an overarching theme indicative of the Commission's
intent to allow double counting.105 Nor do the guidelines provide a
list of permissible or prohibited areas of cumulative punishment from
which to extrapolate that the Commission permits double counting.10 6
100. See supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
101. See, eg., U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 2Bl.1 (defining the offense level for theft crimes).
102. See, e.g., id. § 3B1.1 (defining adjustments for an aggravating role in the crime).
103. Id. § 1B1.1.
104. Language cited by the Fourth Circuit in Curtis was commentary, not guidelines
language. See infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
106. The permissible and prohibited areas of double counting discussed supra in notes 41-51
and accompanying text were defined by the court or by the guidelines commentary and were not
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The Sixth Circuit's rule against double counting is therefore consistent
with the language and structure of the guidelines.
2. No Legislative Intent for Double Counting Exists
As with the language and structure of the guidelines, legislative
intent 10 7 does not support double counting. The key indicator of Con-
gress' intent is the Senate report outlining the findings supporting the
Sentencing Reform Act.108 In this report Congress found that in
preguidelines sentencing judges had too little regard for the relative
seriousness of offenses."°9 The report shows that Congress found
sentences that are too severe in relation to others create unnecessary
tension among inmates, leading to discipline problems in prison. 110
Congress' goal was to create a system of ranked seriousness that the
guidelines embody. 1I It intended to treat categories of offenders con-
sistently without resorting to narrow sentencing statutes.112  It also
sought to eliminate problems created by offenders who might fall into
more than one category. 1 3 Congress did not, however, call for more
severe sentences.
These findings do not show that Congress intended for sentence
enhancements to apply cumulatively for the same conduct. Instead
they show that a primary concern was for proportional sentences with-
out over-punishing.1 The legislative history of the Sentencing
Reform Act, therefore, does not support double counting. Instead, it
suggests that Congress did not intend such cumulative punishment.
The Sentencing Commission commentary, likewise, does not sup-
port double counting. Its policy statement largely summarizes the
enabling statutes, reiterating the purposes of the guidelines, 1 5 but pro-
vides no rationale for sentencing nor any statements giving insight into
whether the Commission intended to permit double counting. The
Sentencing Commission intentionally avoided adopting a criminal
punishment philosophy. 6 If the Commission had adopted such a
defined in the guidelines themselves. See infra notes 136-57 and accompanying text (criticizing
the Fourth Circuit's attempt to equate commentary with the guidelines).
107. See supra note 59.
108. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221.
109. Id at 39, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222.
110. Id. at 45-46, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3228-29.
111. IdL at 51, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3234.
112. Id
113. Id.
114. Id. at 39, 52, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222, 3235 (sentencing legislation should be "fair
both to the offender and to society").
115. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, at 1-2.
116. Id at 2-3.
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philosophy, courts could determine whether double counting was con-
sistent with that philosophy and make a better determination as to the
Commission's intent to permit or prohibit double counting. The only
Commission commentary that provides insight into the Commission's
views of double counting is found in the section application notes.
These notes indicate that, at least in some circumstances, the Commis-
sion did not intend for courts to double count conduct in two or more
enhancements.1 1 7 They show that where double counting was easily
foreseeable, the Commission attempted to eliminate the problem.
Thus, the only meaningful insight into the Commission's thoughts on
multiple enhancements is that in some instances it foresaw and prohib-
ited double counting. The Sixth Circuit's rule against double counting
is, therefore, consistent with Congress' and the Sentencing Commis-
sion's intent.
3. The Motivating Policy of Proportionality is Inconsistent With
Double Counting
Double counting defeats the congressional goal to create a sentenc-
ing system that promotes proportionality in sentencing."" The
enhancement mechanisms are the main avenue for obtaining propor-
tionality. 119 They serve to more severely punish defeadants who com-
mit crimes in more egregious ways. The Sentencing Commission
examined criminal conduct and assigned sentence increases based on
its determination of the penalty that certain conduct should carry. 20
Double counting warps that determination. For example, if a three-
level enhancement under the adjustments section of the guidelines
includes conduct considered in a two-level increase under the specific
offense characteristics of the crime, courts will enhance sentences by
five levels even though the Commission determined that the conduct
only warranted a three-level increase. Proportionality is lost because
crimes that are more susceptible to double counting will have more
severe sentences. 12' The goal of proportionality, one of the two main
117. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
118. See Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1,
22-24 (1987). Of course, any rule on double counting consistently applied satisfies the goal of a
uniform sentencing system.
119. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
120. See U.S.S.G, supra note 2, at 3-4 (discussing how the Commission established the
sentence ranges).
121. In United States v. Curtis, 934 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1991), for example, the defendant's
cumulative punishment for more than minimal planning, and for being an organizer of the crime
amounted to a four-level enhancement. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. This is
the same offense level increase that the Commission applies to those whose assault results in
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goals of the sentencing reform act, suggests that double counting
should not occur.122 The Sixth Circuit's rule against double counting
is, therefore, consistent with the motivating policy of proportionality
in sentencing. 123
4. The Rule of Lenity Requires a Rule Against Double Counting
Double counting is not supported by the language and structure of
the guidelines or the legislative intent, and is inconsistent with the
motivating policies of the Sentencing Reform Act. Even if any ambi-
guity about intent to allow double counting exists, double counting is
still impermissible under the rule of lenity.124 The rule of lenity does
not allow double counting unless the guidelines explicitly call for it.
The rule of lenity as applied to the guidelines serves two purposes.
First, the rule requires that would-be criminal offenders receive fair
warning of the potential sentence they could receive. 125 An ambiguity
in the guidelines prevents this and therefore a court must resolve the
ambiguity in the defendant's favor. 126  Second, the rule requires that
legislators determine criminal penalties.' 27 By forcing judges to
resolve ambiguity in favor of defendants, Congress maintains control
of punishment.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the rule of lenity to
double counting under the sentencing guidelines. 12  The court found
that nothing in the guidelines or its commentary indicates that the
Sentencing Commission intended cumulative punishment. 129  The
court refused to guess as to what Congress and the Commission
serious bodily injury. See U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 2A2.2(b)(3)(B). If the Commission intended
this more severe punishment, the logical approach would have been to increase the offense level
rather than to double count conduct.
122. The goal of Congress to create a sentencing system that alleviates prison overcrowding
also suggests a rule against double counting. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (1988); see also supra note
19. Counting the same conduct in more than one enhancement leads to more prison time for
crimes that lack greater severity. If courts only apply the enhancement with the larger increase
in offense level, they would alleviate overcrowding without sacrificing the goals of sentencing.
123. Conversely, the Fourth Circuit rule in Curtis is inconsistent with the motivating policies
of the Sentencing Reform Act.
124. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. This is especially true where the penalty
attempts to deter future crimes.
126. The probability that offenders would heed this fair warning is, of course, quite slim.
However, because criminal sentences are at least in part founded on the idea of deterrence, see,
e-g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), sentencing statutes should provide offenders the opportunity to
be deterred.
127. See supra notes 62--64 and accompanying text.
128. United States v. Romano, 970 F.2d 164, 167 (6th Cir. 1992).
129. Id (quoting United States v. Werlinger, 894 F.2d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1990)).
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intended, and resolved the double counting issue in favor of less pun-
ishment."' 0 The Sixth Circuit was correct in its holding. The rule of
lenity does not permit double counting.
5. A Rule Against Double Counting is Consistent With State Court
Decisions
State courts support a rule against double counting. The structure
of state sentencing guidelines and statutes differ from the federal
guidelines,131 but the goals behind them are largely the same. 132 State
courts have held that double counting is impermissible. In Washing-
ton, for example, the state supreme court held that judges cannot use,
as aggravating factors, conduct necessarily considered in the presump-
tive sentence. 133 Likewise, the New Jersey courts have also prohibited
double counting of aggravating factors. 1 3  Due to the problems of
proportionality, states have prohibited double counting.1 35 The fed-
eral courts should follow suit and likewise prohibit double counting
under the guidelines.
B. The Fourth Circuit Approach to Double Counting is Incorrect
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Curtis,1 3 6 incorrectly con-
cluded that the guidelines indicated that the Commission intended
double counting. Moreover, the court's analysis leading to its conclu-
sion was flawed. As discussed above, the language and structure of the
guidelines show no indication that the Sentencing Commission
130. Id
131. The Washington guidelines, for example, have a small list of enhancements, most
notably the use of a firearm during a crime. See WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.310(3) (1992). For
a comparison of the federal guidelines and the Washington guidelines, see John M. Junker,
Guidelines Sentencing: The Washington Experience, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 715 (1992).
132. S. RaP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 63, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.i.A.N. at 3246; see also,
e.g., State v. Yarbough, 498 A.2d 1239, 1243-44 (N.J. 1985) ("The paramount goal of
sentencing reform was greater uniformity.... [Sentencing] purposes zenter upon the concept
that punishment of crime be based primarily on principles of deserved punishment in proportion
to the offense"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
133. State v. Dunaway, 109 Wash. 2d 207, 218, 743 P.2d 1237, 1242 (1987). The Washington
Supreme Court stated: "A reason offered to justify an exceptional sentence is sufficient only if it
'take[s] into account factors other than those which are necessarily considered in computing the
presumptive range for the offense.'" Id (quoting State v. Norby, 106 Wash. 2d 514, 518, 723
P.2d 1117, 1117 (1986)). Note that the analogy to the federal guidelines is not perfect.
Washington's aggravating factors lie somewhere between enhancements and departures under
the federal guidelines.
134. Yarbough, 498 A.2d at 1248 (judicially adopting criteria from the Model Sentencing and
Corrections Act (U.L.A. 1974), including a prohibition on double counting).
135. See id at 1249.
136. 934 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1991).
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intended that courts double count conduct. 137 The Fourth Circuit
improperly equated guidelines commentary with statutory language
and inappropriately applied a disfavored canon of statutory construc-
tion to this commentary.
The Fourth Circuit incorrectly relied on guidelines commentary to
support double counting. The court based its conclusion in Curtis on
two areas of the guidelines: the application notes to various enhance-
ments in the adjustments section of the guidelines, and the commen-
tary in the general application principles to the guidelines. 13' The
court incorrectly interpreted the implications of both of these sections
of commentary.
The court's first error was treating sections of commentary as part
of the guidelines. Although the application notes and other commen-
tary pass through Congress, they are not guidelines. They are instead
unique statutory features-not statute, but of greater importance than
legislative history. 139 On the one hand, commentary that interprets or
explains a particular guideline is binding on the courts and must be
followed.1" On the other hand, the application notes are not guide-
lines themselves and thus do not carry the same force of law.141 The
weight courts should give to the commentary depends on the court's
usage of the commentary.
The Curtis court erred by granting undue weight to the commen-
tary. The application notes that prohibit double counting 42 apply
only to the guidelines to which they are directed. When courts use the
application notes to interpret these guidelines, courts can properly
regard the application notes as quasi-statutory language.143 When
interpreting different guidelines, however, the application notes do not
rise to the level of statutory language and have no place in the lan-
guage analysis of statutory construction. 44
137. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
139. United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1991) (en bane); see also U.S.S.G.,
supra note 2, § IB1.7 (stating that commentary may interpret or explain how a court should
apply a guideline).
140. Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1919 (1993); see also Anderson, 942 F.2d at 610
(citing U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § IB1.7 which states that "Iflailure to follow such commentary
could constitute an incorrect application of the guidelines"); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) (stating
that courts shall have due regard to the applicable policy statements of the Commission).
141. See Anderson, 942 F.2d at 611.
142. See, ag., U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 3Al.1 cmt. 2.
143. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1919. The application notes, however, must not be "inconsistent
with, or a plainly erroneous reading of the guideline." Id.
144. Cf Anderson, 942 F.2d at 612 (stating that "guideline and commentary... should be
construed as to be consistent with the scheme of other guidelines (and their commentary) within
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Not only did the Curtis court give undue weight to commentary, but
it misinterpreted one section. The court relied on commentary in the
general application principles to the guidelines directing courts to
cumulatively apply enhancements for specific offense characteristics
within a guideline, unless the guideline states otherwise.145 The Com-
mission directed this commentary only at enhancements within each
specific offense characteristics subsection of an offense guideline. The
court used this commentary to direct cumulative application between
enhancements in a specific offense characteristics subsection and
enhancements in the adjustments section. The commentary cited by
the court clearly does not call for such cumulative application. Thus,
even treating the commentary cited by the Curtis court as quasi-statu-
tory language, no indication exists from the language of the guidelines
that the Commission intended double counting. Furthermore, no
indication of any such intent exists from the structure of the guide-
lines. 46 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, erred twice in relying on
guidelines commentary; first by using commentary fbr an inappropri-
ate purpose and second by misinterpreting another section of
commentary.
Even taken in its proper role as something more than legislative his-
tory, the commentary to the adjustments used by the Fourth Circuit
does not support the court's conclusion that the Commission intended
double counting. This commentary applies only to the guidelines in
which it is included. The Fourth Circuit attempted to overcome this
limitation by applying statutory construction tools tc the commentary.
This was incorrect.
The court in Curtis applied the canon of statutory construction
expressio unis147 to these application notes and concluded that since
the Commission prohibited double counting in some instances, it must
have intended it in all other instances. 14 The court ignored the appli-
cation notes' status as commentary and incorrectly treated them as
statute.
It is inappropriate to apply the canons of statutory construction to
nonstatutory language in order to interpret an otherwise ambiguous
the Part as a whole") (emphasis added). Note that the Fourth Circuit applied commentary
between parts of the guidelines, parts A and B of the adjustments section. United States v.
Curtis, 934 F.2d 553, 556 (4th Cir. 1991).
145. See supra note 83.
146. See infra notes 147-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit's attempt
to glean intent from the structure of commentary, not the guidelines).
147. See supra note 81.
148. Curtis, 934 F.2d at 556.
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statute. The Supreme Court has held that expressio unis should not be
applied to congressional committee reports.149 The Court reasoned
that a committee should not be expected to have foreseen every possi-
ble application of a contemplated rule. 150 Presumably the Commis-
sion intended that courts use its commentary to interpret the guideline
to which it relates. 5 ' To apply such commentary to other guidelines
would require the Commission to foresee every possible application of
commentary to every guideline. If the Commission intended that
courts use commentary like statutory language, it would simply put
the information in the guidelines themselves.1 52
Furthermore, courts and commentators increasingly disfavor the
use of expressio unis even to statutes themselves.1 3 Courts have rec-
ognized that they should use the canon with care15 4 because it is an
uncertain guide to legislative intent and is often based on an
unfounded assumption that the legislature considered and rejected all
factors.1 55 Some courts have restricted its use by requiring some evi-
dence from the statute's language that the legislature intended the
maxim to apply. 6 The guidelines do not indicate that the Commis-
sion considered all possible areas of double counting. Indeed, the
Commission has stated that it did not, and could not, consider all pos-
sible combinations of criminal conduct. 57 The list of permitted or
prohibited areas of double counting, therefore, does not indicate that
149. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 20 n.12 (1980) (rejecting an attempt to apply
expressio unis to a committee report in order to read ambiguity into a criminal statute).
150. Id.
151. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § IBI.7 states that commentary accompanying the guideline
sections serves several purposes. "First, it may interpret the guideline or explain how it is to be
applied.... Finally, the commentary may provide background information, including factors
considered in promulgating the guideline or reasons underlying promulgation of the guideline"
(emphasis added).
152. United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606, 611 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
153. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
234-35 (1975) (arguing that expressio unis is more a description of what courts discover from
context than an interpretive aid).
154. McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 667 (3rd Cir.) cerL denied, 449
U.S. 976 (1980); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950)
(describing how every canon of construction has a counter-canon).
155. Tri-State Terminals, Inc. v. Jesse, 596 F.2d 752, 755 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979).
156. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.25 (5th ed.
1992); see also Columbia Hosp. Ass'n v. Milwaukee, 151 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Wis. 1967).
157. The Commission stated that its data did not enable it to conclude that all aggravating
factors were empirically important to the offense to warrant an enhancement provision.
U.S.S.G., supra note 2, at 4. This, along with the policy to allow departures only in instances
where the Commission had not adequately considered the circumstances, indicates that the
Commission did not include all factors in the guidelines.
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the Commission considered all possible instances of double counting
and decided that some were acceptable. The commentary to the
guidelines does not support a conclusion that the Commission
intended double counting to occur.
III. CONCLUSION
Congress and the Sentencing Commission promulgated the federal
sentencing guidelines to reduce sentencing disparity and increase sen-
tencing proportionality. In doing so, they have created confusion as to
whether certain sentence enhancements are meant to apply cumula-
tively when conduct supplying the basis for an enhancement under the
adjustments section necessarily includes conduct fitting the definition
of a specific offense characteristic enhancement. The language and
structure of the guidelines and the legislative histoxy do not support
double counting. The motivating policies of sentencing reform suggest
that courts should not double count conduct. Even if the guidelines
are ambiguous, courts should resolve this ambiguity in the favor of
criminal defendants and the courts should not permit double counting.
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